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Abstract 
 
For people working in finance, either in academia or in practice or in both, the 
combination of ‘finance’ and ‘multiple criteria’ is not obvious. However, we believe 
that many of the tools developed in the field of MCDM can contribute both to the 
quality of the financial economic decision making process and to the quality of the 
resulting decisions. In this paper we answer the question why financial decision 
problems should be considered as multiple criteria decision problems and should be 
treated accordingly. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This special issue is devoted to MCDM and finance. For people working in finance, 
either in academia or in practice or in both, the combination of ‘finance’ and ‘multiple 
criteria’ is not obvious. For many years, we have been involved in the study and 
practice of financial economic decision making. Our main focus was and is on 
financial management science, the development of tools and frameworks to support 
financial decision making. We are convinced that many financial decision problems 
are in fact multiple criteria decision problems. In addition, we believe that many of 
the tools developed in the field of MCDM contribute both to the quality of the 
financial economic decision making process and to the quality of the resulting 
decisions. In this paper we answer the question why financial decision problems 
should be considered as multiple criteria decision problems and should be treated 
accordingly. 
 
The central issue in financial economics is the efficient allocation of scarce capital 
and resources over alternative uses. The allocation (and redistribution) of capital takes 
place on financial markets and is termed ‘efficient’ when market value is maximized. 
Just as water will flow to the lowest point, the capital will flow to the uses that offer 
the highest return. Therefore it seems that the criterion to guide financial decisions is 
uni-dimensional: maximize the market value or maximize future return. 
 From a financial economic perspective the goal of the corporate firm, for 
example, is very much single objective. Management should maximize the firm’s 
contribution to the financial wealth of its shareholders. Also the shareholders are 
considered to be myopic. Their only objective is to maximize their single dimensional 
financial wealth. The link between the shareholders and the corporate firm is footed in 
law. Shareholders are the owners of the firm. They possess the property rights of the 
firm and are thus entitled to decide what the firm should aim for, which in this line of 
thinking is the same for all shareholders, i.e. maximization of the contribution to the 
financial wealth of the shareholders. The firm can accomplish this by engaging in 
investment projects with positive net present value. This is a neo-classical view on the 
role of the firm and the relationship between the firm and its shareholders in a 
capitalist society. Figure 1 depicts a simplified graphical representation of this line of 
thought. 
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Figure 1 The neo-classical view on the objective of the corporate firm 
 
It is important to note that this position is embedded in a much larger framework of 
stylized thinking in among others economics (general equilibrium framework) and 
law (property rights theory and limited liability of shareholders). Until today, this 
view is seen as an ideal by many; see for example Jensen [2001]. Presently, however, 
the societal impact of the firm and its governance structure is a growing topic of 
debate and discussion. 
 
Here we will show that also in finance there are many roads leading to Rome, or 
rather to the quasi Roman numeral MCDM. Whether one belongs to the camp of 
Jensen or to the camp of those advocating socially responsible entrepreneurship, one 
has to deal with multiple criteria. The following section is devoted to the position of 
the firm, while the third section addresses the position of the financial investor. The 
fourth section discusses the issue of risk management that relates to both the firm and 
the investor. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Multiple Criteria Financial Decisions and the Firm 
 
In this section we describe a series of situations in which the firm chooses (or has to 
take account of) a multiplicity of objectives and (policy) constraints. An overview of 
these situations is depicted in Figure 2. One issue is who decides on the objective(s) 
of the firm. If there is a multiplicity of parties who may decide what the firm is aiming 
for, one generally encounters a multitude of goals, constraints and considerations that 
- more often than not - will be at least partially conflictive. A clear example is the 
conflicting objectives arising from agency problems (Jensen & Meckling [1976]). 
This means that the decision problems that have to be solved are characterized by 
multiple criteria and multiple actors (viz. group decision making, negotiation theory, 
see Box 3 in Figure 2). Sometimes, all those who decide on what the firm should aim 
for agree upon exactly the same objective(s). In fact, this is what neo-classical 
financial theory assumes when adopting shareholder value maximization (Box 1 in 
Figure 2). In practice, there are many firms that explicitly strive for a multiplicity of 
goals which naturally leads to decision problems with multiple objectives (Box 2 in 
Figure 3).  
 However, although these firms do explicitly state to take account of multiple 
objectives, there are still very few of these firms that make use of tools provided by 
the MCDM literature. In most cases firms maximize one objective subject to (policy) 
constraints on the other objectives. As such there is nothing wrong with such a 
procedure as long as the location of these policy constraints is chosen correctly. In 
practice, however, one often observes that there is no discussion at all about the 
location of the policy constraints. Moreover, there is often no idea about the trade-offs 
between the location of the various constraints and the objective function which is 
maximized. In our opinion, multiple criteria decision methodologies may help 
decision makers to gain better insights in the trade-offs they are confronted with. 
 
Now let us get back to the case in which the owner(s) / shareholders do have only one 
objective in mind: wealth maximization. Although this is by definition the most 
prominent candidate for single objective decision making, we will argue that even in 
this case there are many circumstances in which the formulation as a multiple criteria 
decision problem is opportune. 
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 In order to contribute maximally to the wealth of its shareholders, an 
individual firm should maximize the value of its shares. The value of these shares is 
determined on the financial markets by the dynamic forces of demand and supply. 
Shares represent claims on the future residual cash flows of the firm (and also a 
usually very limited right on corporate control). In the view of the financial markets, 
the value of such a claim is determined relative to the claims of other firms that are 
traded on these markets. The financial markets’ perception of the quality of these cash 
flow claims is crucial for the valuation of the shares. Translated to the management of 
the individual firm, the aim is not only to maximize the quality of the future residual 
cash flows of the firm but also to properly communicate all news about these cash 
flows to the financial markets. Only by disclosing this information to the financial 
markets potential information asymmetries can be resolved and the fair market value 
of a cash flow stream can be gauged. In evaluating the possible consequences of its 
decision alternatives, management should estimate the effects on the uncertain 
(future) cash flows followed by an estimation of the financial markets’ valuation of 
these effects. Then (and only then) the decision rule of management is very simple: 
choose the decision alternative that generates the highest estimated market value. 
 
The first problem that might arise while following the above prescription is that 
residual claims cannot always be defined because of ‘gaming effects’ (see Figure 2, 
Box 2). In other words, the future cash flows of the firm do not only depend on the 
present and future decisions of the firm’s management, but also on the present and 
future decisions of other parties. An obvious example is the situation of oligopolistic 
markets in which the decisions of the competitors may strongly influence each other. 
Simular situations may arise with other external stakeholders such as powerful clients, 
powerful suppliers and powerful financiers. Games may also arise within the firm, for 
instance between management and certain key production factors. The problem with 
game situations is that the effect (on the firm’s future cash flows) caused by the other 
parties involved cannot be treated as simple constraints or as cost factors in the cash 
flow calculation. MCDM may help to solve this problem by formulating multi-
dimensional profiles of the consequences of the firm’s decision alternatives. In these 
profiles also the effects on other parties than the firm itself is included. These multi-
dimensional profiles are the keys to open the complete MCDM toolbox. 
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 The second problem in dealing with the single objective wealth maximization 
problem is that the quality of information concerning the firm’s future cash flows 
under different decision alternatives is far from complete (complete in terms of 
probability distributions and / or stochastic processes). In addition, the available 
information may be biased or flawed. One way to approach the incomplete 
information problem is suggested by Spronk & Hallerbach [1997]. In their multi-
factorial approach, different sources of uncertainty should be identified after which 
the exposures of the cash flows to these risk sources are estimated. The estimated 
exposures can next be included in a multicriteria decision method. In the case that the 
available information is not conclusive, different ‘views’ on the future cash flows may 
developed. Next each of these views can be adopted as representing a different 
dimension of the decision problem. The resulting multi-dimensional decision problem 
can then be handled by using MCDM (see Figure 2, Box 2). 
 The third potential problem in wealth maximization is that the financial 
markets do not always provide the relevant pricing signals to evaluate the wealth 
effects of the firm’s decisions, for example because of market inefficiencies. This 
means that the firm may want to include attributes other than the market’s pricing 
signals alone in order to measure the riskiness and wealth effects of its decisions.  
 
3. Multiple Criteria Financial Decisions and the Investor 
 
Maximizing market value is the central paradigm in financial economic decision-
making. There is one complication, however. Current market value originates from 
future cash flows. A common share of stock, for example, derives its value from the 
dividends that are expected to be received in the future (and from its subsequent 
selling price). Likewise, the value of a bond depends on the coupon payments and 
final repayment of the nominal face value. In a frictionless market (in which one can 
trade immediately at no transaction costs) one would indeed be indifferent between 
receiving $100 in cash, $ 100 in stocks or $ 100 in long term bonds. After all, the 
stocks or bonds can be sold immediately in the market resulting in a cash position of  
$ 100.  
 The choice situation is completely different when we rephrase the problem as 
holding a position of $ 100 in cash, stocks or bonds over a period of say one year. 
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Now we are confronted with the cash flows that will be generated by the position 
during this holding period of one year, and with the value that will be realized at the 
end of the period. The degree of uncertainty attached to the cash flows from a risk 
free position, a long term bond and a stock is fundamentally different. It is therefore 
not feasible to maximize ‘the’ return over the holding period, for the simple reason 
that the return is stochastic. Maximizing expected future return does not make sense 
either since this criterion ignores risk (strictly speaking, with probability one the 
realized return will deviate from expected return).  
  
How does financial theory solve this problem? In the neo-classical approach to 
finance it is assumed that an expected utility function, defined in terms of future 
wealth or holding period return, is maximized. The optimal decision rule is derived 
from confronting the preferences of the investor with the probability distribution of 
future investment returns. This allowed the Nobel laureate Markowitz [1952, 1959] to 
formalize the formerly undefined notion of risk by equating risk with the variability of 
returns in a portfolio context, and to operationalize this risk concept by means of the 
(co-) variance or standard deviation. From this emerges the concept of a mean-
variance efficient portfolio: given its level of risk its maximizes expected return, and 
given its level of expected return it minimizes risk. The trade-off between expected 
return and standard deviation embedded in his preference structure allows an investor 
to choose a suitable portfolio from the mean-variance efficient (i.e. non-dominated) 
set. In this way the mean-variance decision criterion is a two-parameter substitutive 
criterion (see Sinn [1983], e.g.).  
 Note that the adopted preference functional is defined on single dimensional 
wealth or return. This relates to the left hand side of Figure 2, where there is only a 
single objective. But what about the two dimensions: expected return and risk? Well, 
because of the assumed substitutability between risk and expected return these two 
dimensions can be collapsed into a single preference dimension. This is even more 
apparent when one is willing to assume that risk free investment opportunities exist. 
In that case the optimal portfolio is simply the portfolio that maximizes the uni-
dimensional Sharpe [1966, 1994] ratio. 
 Obviously, the simplicity of the mean-variance decision rule goes at a cost. In 
order to derive the decision rule, quite restrictive assumptions have to be made either 
with respect to the preferences of the decision maker (quadratic utility) or with respect 
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to the representation of choice alternatives (joint ellipticity, cf. Owen & Rabinovitch 
[1983]). This is important since the mean-variance decision rule is truly “conditional 
normative” in the spirit of  Keynes [1891]. The decision rule is normative and guides 
to optimal decisions, conditional on satisfying the underlying assumptions.  
 
Now we turn to investment practice. How likely will the assumptions underlying the 
mean-variance approach be satisfied? Even within the context of a preference 
functional defined in terms of single dimensional wealth, variance may be an 
inadequate risk measure. After all, there is an important difference between variability 
per se and risk, especially when return distributions are asymmetric. For example, 
downside variability is perceived as risk, and this may explain the obvious success 
with which the financial community has embraced the downside risk metric “Value-
at-Risk” (Jorion [2000]). Upside variability, in contrast, is evaluated positively as 
“potential”.  
 In addition, a single dimensional risk measure may not prove sufficient to 
adequately discriminate between investment alternatives. In financial practice it is 
recognized that the potential variability in the returns can be attributed to the 
variability in several underlying state variables or economic factors. Some examples 
are interest rates, inflation, economic growth, and even market sentiments. Each of 
these factors represents a dimension of the economic environment in which the 
security returns are generated. We can thus view the returns as being generated by the 
factors. Conversely, the stochastic outcomes are conditioned on these factors. This 
notion can be formalized by a factor model.2 The relationship between a security’s 
return and changes in these factors is described by a response coefficient or factor 
sensitivity. By means of these sensitivities, the joint distribution of security returns is 
linked to (i.e. conditioned on) the joint distribution of factor changes. In this 
interpretation, the sensitivity coefficients can serve as risk measures; together they 
constitute the multi-dimensional risk profile of a decision alternative. As the 
variability of returns is linked to the variability in various identifiable economic 
variables, investment risk becomes an intuitively appealing, multi-dimensional 
concept. 
 The use of factor models permits replacing return variance as a uni-
dimensional risk measure by multi-dimensional risk measures. These measures 
                                                 
2 See for example Sharpe, Alexander & Bailey [1999]. 
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provide more insight in the nature of risk perceived by investors than a uni-
dimensional, ‘aggregate’ risk measure. In order to shape the risk profile of an 
investment portfolio not only the trade-offs among the exposures to the various 
factors must be evaluated, but also the trade-off between expected return on the one 
hand and different factor risks on the other. It may be clear that forcing this decision 
problem into the straitjacket of a single dimensional objective function with policy 
constraints will result in a very poor description of the actual decision context. 
Obviously this provides a fruitful area for MCDM applications. 
 
In our opinion the multifarious nature of perceived risk is only the first argument for 
applying MCDM. Experiences from practice show that explicit return and risk 
attributes do not seem to capture all relevant information (cf. the early research by 
Baker & Haslem [1974], for example). To fill this gap, additional attributes may be 
incorporated at the investor’s discretion. These indirectly return related attributes may 
be considered of general relevance in practice, but may also be relevant because of 
idiosyncrasies in the investor’s personal decision context. In the latter case, the 
incorporation of additional attributes can be motivated from either the specific tastes 
and desires (goals) of the investor, from specific investment constraints he faces, or 
from distinctive characteristics of the investment alternatives. For example, because 
of the investor’s tax situation, the taxability of the portfolio components may be a 
relevant attribute. In terms of ‘liquidity’ or the flexibility to revise the portfolio’s 
composition, the marketability of the component securities may be relevant. 
Especially the Long Term Capital Management debacle in September 1998 revealed 
the crucial importance of market liquidity. Because of some method of performance 
measurement, the position with respect to some benchmark portfolio may be relevant, 
and so on. In addition, the investor may adher to the notion that not all future events 
can be reduced to probability distributions, not even when the latter are of a subjective 
nature. This also implies that attributes may be considered in addition to explicit 
elements of return and explicit components of risk. We must seriously consider the 
possibility that some of these ‘other’ attributes act in fact as proxies for (components 
of) expected return and risk.   
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 Many attributes are considered important, not only from a practical point of 
view, but also from an academic point of view because they represent ‘anomalies’.3 
For common stocks, ‘firm size’ is a long-time notorious variable. Other examples are 
price ratios as indicators for fundamental firm value, like earnings/price, book/price 
(book value of common equity per share divided by market price per share), cash 
flow/price, sales/price and dividend/price. In the context of ‘value investing’ there is 
great renewed interest in these long time familiar attributes.4  
 In the view of (positive) financial theory, an attribute’s ability to contribute to 
the explanation of cross-sectional return differences appears to be a convincing 
criterion for the selection of relevant attributes. However, an attribute will only carry 
a significant premium when it is ‘priced’ in the market. But a non-average investor 
can face a set of investment opportunities that is different from the market (i.e. the 
average investor). For example, his opportunity set can be restrained by investment 
restrictions or by prohibitive transactions costs. Hence this investor is only interested 
in the relevance of this attribute in his opportunity set. Furthermore, partly connected 
to the former argument, the reward that an investor attaches to the exposure to an 
attribute (a ‘subjective’ premium) may well be different from the premium that the 
market as a whole attaches to that attribute (the ‘objective’ premium). The difference 
between objective and subjective premia just reflects the differences in the preference 
structure of the investor vis à vis the market as a whole. This leads us back to the 
starting point that the selection of attributes depends on the personal circumstances of 
the investor, as summarized in his profile. In brief, there exist many security attributes 
that are relevant in practice, despite the stylized neo-classical view of financial theory. 
 
How can the decision making process be shaped in this general multi-attribute 
context? Suppose that an investor can demarcate a set of security attributes that he 
considers relevant. On the basis of these attributes he can discriminate between the 
attractiveness of various securities.5 For the investor, a financial security then 
                                                 
3 An attribute is an anomaly with respect to an asset pricing theory when that attribute 
possesses power to explain cross-sectional variation in expected returns in addition to 
the risk measures as specified by the pricing model at hand. An attribute is an 
anomaly with respect to the efficient market hypothesis when it can be used to 
forecast future returns. For an overview we refer to Sharpe, Alexander & Bailey 
[1999]. 
4 See for example Fama & French [1992, 1993]. 
5 This view is borrowed from consumer choice theory; cf. Lancaster [1966]. 
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represents a basket of, say, k attributes and can be fully characterized by a k-tuple of 
attribute values. In an investor’s view, when buying a security, he is actually buying 
an exposure to various attributes. Hence, we can specify a mapping of the securities in 
the space spanned by the attributes:  
 
 security i →{ ai1 , ai2 , ... , aij , ... , aik } , i ∈ N    (1) 
 
where aij is the value that attribute j takes for security i. The opportunity set an 
investor faces can then be described in terms of a multi-attribute representation of the 
N available securities. For a given portfolio, its score on a certain attribute is a 
function of the attribute scores of the individual securities contained in this portfolio. 
The fractions invested in each of these securities can thus be treated as instrumental 
variables and the attribute exposures can be seen as goal variables. The investment 
problem now becomes a multi-attribute portfolio selection problem where the investor 
strives to balance the attributes of the individual securities on the portfolio level. 
Given the security attributes and the specific decision context, the investor strives to 
fashion the attributes of his portfolio in a way that suits his particular circumstances 
and preferences best. Often, the investor will try to either minimize or maximize each 
of these goal variables. Alternatively, the investor may strive to attain a target level or 
desired score on some attribute(s). Depending on the investor’s insights and 
preferences, the relative importance of each of these goals may vary. Generally, no 
portfolio can be found for which each of the goal variables reaches its optimal value 
or for which all criteria are met. As a consequence, the investor has to evaluate the 
trade-offs between the various goal variables.  This calls for multi-criteria decision 
methods. In this context, a single objective decision framework would become a 
Procrustes bed, chopping off any other characteristics of the investment alternatives 
that the investor may consider important. 
 The notion that the portfolio investment decision for individual investors calls 
for a multi-attribute approach dates back to Smith [1974, p.53]; Spronk & Hallerbach 
[1997] present a general framework for moulding the financial investment decision 
process, labelled ‘multi-attribute approach to portfolio selection’. Of course, there are 
many more examples of moulding the portfolio selection problem in terms of multi-
criteria decision making. However, one can observe that most (if not all) of these 
approaches are at best only partial. Either they fail to give room for the inherent 
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complexity of the decision procedure, or they concentrate on the beauties of a 
particular multiple criteria decision method taking insufficient account of the decision 
context and of the results and principles of financial economic theory. 
 In our opinion, portfolio problems signify a fertile ground for applying 
MCDM methods. However, the potential rewards will only be reaped when the stage 
of applying MCDM methods to a given financial decision problem is surpassed and 
MCDM and financial knowledge is integrated. An important additional desirable 
feature of the applied MCDM technology is the possibility to explore the decision 
context. Instead of hiding the solution process and presenting the final solution in one 
step to the decision maker, one should allow the decision maker to learn about his 
preferences and about the characteristics of the investment opportunities. For 
example, the selection of relevant attributes is no ‘once and for all’ activity. The 
investor’s decision context and the securities’ economic environment may change 
over time and may become better understood because of learning effects. In addition 
the investor can evaluate the trade-offs offered by the investment alternatives and 
compare them with the desired trade-offs.  
 
 
4. Risk management 
 
Financial markets are forward-looking: current market value incorporates the 
market’s expectations regarding the future. Changes in these expectations will induce 
changes in value. This implies that it is not only important to consider current market 
value as an important (but not the single) aspect of financial decisions, but also to 
incorporate the notion of potential future changes in this value. This calls for a risk 
analysis of the decision alternatives, in which the sources of risk and the 
corresponding exposures are identified – and possibly quantified. Moreover, when 
time passes by the current value must be guarded and protected against unwanted 
influences that may corrode this value. This in turn implies the need for risk 
management: the process of adjusting risk exposures in such a way that the desired 
risk profile is attained. 
  
From the previous discussion, the role of risk analysis and risk management for 
financial investment decisions may be clear. Indeed, considering the level of volatility 
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on financial markets the claim that financial investment is mainly risk management is 
not exaggerated. Especially in an asset-liability context (for banks, pension funds and 
insurance companies) investment decisions are driven by the desire to match the risk 
profiles of the liability portfolio on the one hand and the investment portfolio on the 
other. There are multiple risk sources (interest rates, economic growth, inflation, e.g.) 
and choosing the desired risk profile entails evaluating the trade-offs among the 
different risk exposures and between the risks on one side and expected return on the 
other. This calls for multicriteria decision methods.  
 Even in the simple case where an investment portfolio seems to be only 
sensitive to interest rate risk (a fixed income portfolio) a multicriteria approach can 
add value. Since long, a bond’s interest rate exposure is measured by duration, 
defined as the (negative of the) bond’s interest rate elasticity (see Fabozzi [1997]). 
However, the concept of duration assumes that the term structure of interest rates will 
only move in a parallel way. A richer description of interest rate risk can be obtained 
by allowing any shift in the term structure of interest rates. Instead of one single 
duration measure one could use a set of partial durations, each measuring the 
sensitivity of the bond price to changes in some specified rate. This is analogous to 
the multi-factor model discussed before. Reitano [1990, 1996] and Ho [1992] specify 
a set of key spot interest rates and consider the bond price sensitivities for changes in 
these key rates. Key rate durations may be used to account for the three major interest 
rate risk factors as identified by Litterman & Scheinkman [1991]: changes in the 
level, slope and curvature of the spot rate curve. Positioning a fixed income portfolio 
in an uncertain interest rate environment involves gauging the exposures to different 
sources of interest rate risk and evaluating the trade-off among different exposures as 
well as between risks and returns. Especially when the trade-offs are non-linear, the 
multicriteria specification of the decision problem cannot simply be collapsed into a 
two-parameter risk-return substitutive criterion. When translating additional criteria 
into restrictions, sight on these trade-offs is lost. 
   
Risk analysis and risk management also play a paramount role in capital investment 
decisions. In the capital budgeting process the risk profile of the future cash flows 
generated by investment projects must be clearly understood. With the increasing 
globalization of markets, increased competition and fast changing consumer 
preferences, the economic environment in which these cash flows are generated can 
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change drastically in many dimensions. The firm then faces the difficult task to 
evaluate a project’s risk profile and – if necessary – to change this profile by means of 
operational or financial hedging techniques (cf. Smithson [1998], Stulz [2002]). 
Crucial determinant of the decision to hedge is the degree of comparative advantage 
that the firm has in the area of a specific risk source. When the comparative advantage 
is high (as will be the case for the firm’s core activities) the firm can add value for its 
shareholders (and other stakeholders) by maintaining an exposure to the 
corresponding source of risk. Conversely, in the firm may decide to hedge risk 
exposures that are not (or only remotely) related to its core activities. In any case, the 
decision to hedge involves evaluating the trade-offs between the costs and benefits 
attached to exchanging one exposure for another. The interdependency between risk 
sources makes it difficult to evaluate these trade-offs. This is where multicriteria 
methods may help to support the firm in its hedge decisions.  
 Consider for example the airline KLM. KLM experiences the influences of 
different risk sources: it has exposures to foreign currencies (especially the US dollar 
with respect to the euro), interest rates (mainly because of its financing structure) and 
jet fuel prices. The hedging decision involves evaluating the risks and potential 
returns from these various risk sources. However, this risk analysis cannot be 
performed only for KLM in isolation. Also the potential effects of competitors’ 
hedging strategies on KLM’s position have to be taken into account (see Figure 2). 
Suppose, for example, that competitors hedge but KLM does not. When jet fuel (or 
oil) prices increase, KLM experiences a disadvantage relative to its competitors and 
this may hurt its profitability. When KLM would increase fare prices to compensate 
for the increased cost, its relative competitive position may deteriorate, resulting in 
loss of market share. Of course, KLM would experience a relative advantage when jet 
fuel prices decrease but the effect is not symmetrical. After all, it is much more 
difficult to conquer market share than to lose it. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
From the neo-classical perspective of perfect markets, financial decision problems can 
be moulded in terms of a single objective. However, imperfections such as 
information asymmetries, conflicting interests and transactions costs (which restrict 
choice opportunities) require a much richer description of the decision context.  
Focusing on the three main areas of finance – corporate finance, financial investment 
and risk management – we argue that many decision problems involve multiple 
objectives, and sometimes even multiple actors. The fundamental concept of risk, for 
example, is by nature multi-dimensional. Competitive forces to the corporate firm are 
partly driven by decisions of third parties. Consequently, a single objective approach 
to financial decision making becomes a straitjacket. When attempting to cope with 
additional objectives by rephrasing them as policy constraints, the single objective 
feature is preserved. However, this goes at the high cost of losing the information 
about the relevant trade-offs.  
 The multi-dimensional nature of many financial-economic decision problems 
lends itself for the application of MCDM technology. However, to ensure a suitable 
description of the particular decision context at hand and to chose a suitable MCDM 
method to solve the destilled decision problem, financial theory and MCDM should 
be brought closer together. Problem description and problem solving are not two 
separate stages towards making better decisions. Instead, the whole trajectory from 
analyzing the decision context and gathering (imperfect and incomplete) information 
to chosing and implementing a suitable MCDM technology should be spanned. 
Indeed, the complexity of financial choice problems calls for an integration of 
financial and MCDM knowledge. Not only to improve final decisions, but above all 
to improve the quality of the choice process. The latter is necessary in order to cope 
with the frequent changes in the decision context. It allows benefiting from learning 
effects and it may at the same time facilitate the wider acceptance of MCDM 
techniques in practical decision making. 
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